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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature Of The Case
Jered Josiah Wilson appeals from the summary dismissal of his petition
for post-conviction relief.
Statement Of The Facts And Course Of The Proceedings
The state charged Wilson with failure to register as a sex offender in one
case and with two counts of lewd conduct with his daughter in another, and the
two cases were consolidated for trial. State v. Wilson, 2013 Unpublished Opinion
No. 581, Docket 39073, pp. 1-2 (Idaho App., July 12, 2013). He was convicted
by a jury on all three counts. Id. The Court of Appeals vacated his conviction for
failure to register and affirmed his convictions for lewd conduct. Id., at p. 9.
Wilson initiated the current case by petitioning for post-conviction relief.
(R., pp. 4-71.)

Among other claims, he alleged several claims of ineffective

assistance of counsel. (R., pp. 6-38.) The state moved to dismiss the petition,
submitting relevant parts of the criminal case for consideration in relation to the
motion. (R., p.72-156.) The state argued that medical, driving and employment
records did not actually impeach the victim by showing that the defendant would
not have been driving when she claimed, and therefore there was neither
deficient performance nor prejudice from counsel’s decision to not admit those
documents.

(R., pp. 82-83.)

The state argued generally that the proposed

testimony of witnesses did not actually impeach the victim’s testimony, and
therefore failing to pursue these potential witnesses also was not ineffective
assistance of counsel. (R., pp. 83-86.)
1

The district court granted the state’s motion, generally for the reasons
stated in the state’s brief. (R., pp. 163-68; 3/23/15 Tr., p. 9, L. 22 – p. 10, L.1; p.
11, L. 19 – p. 12, L. 12.) The district court stated different reasons for dismissing
the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel in relation to joinder, however,
ultimately finding that conceding to joinder was a legitimate method for averting
having the state bring a persistent violator enhancement. (3/23/15 Tr., p. 10, L. 2
– p. 11, L. 18.)
Wilson timely appealed from the entry of judgment. (R., pp. 168-73.)
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ISSUES
Wilson states the issue on appeal as:
Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Wilson’s
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief?
(Appellant’s brief, p. 7.)
The state rephrases the issues as:
1.
Has Wilson failed to show that he established a prima facie claim that
counsel’s agreement to join the cases and leave them joined for trial in order to
avoid a charge of a persistent violator enhancement was ineffective assistance of
counsel where counsel in fact avoided having the state charge the persistent
violator enhancement?
2.
Has Wilson failed to show error in the summary dismissal of his claim that
trial counsel’s presentation of evidence was ineffective for failing to pursue
evidence that his driver’s license was suspended and that he was medically
unable to drive for some of the time-frame in which he abused the victim?
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ARGUMENT
I.
Wilson Has Failed To Show That He Established A Prima Facie Claim That
Counsel’s Agreement To Join The Cases And Leave Them Joined For Trial In
Order To Avoid A Persistent Violator Enhancement Was Ineffective Assistance
Of Counsel
A.

Introduction
As part of his claim that counsel failed to provide a defense, Wilson

alleged:
Petitioner had repeatedly asked for separate trials; that he first face
the Failure to Register allegations, and then, the Lewd Conduct
Charges. Petitioner felt that if the charges were all combined and
consolidated into one (1) case, then the prosecutor would be able
to keep referencing his prior convictions, and keep using the Failure
to Register allegations against him in order to negatively affect,
sway and prejudice the jury against Petitioner, and this eventually
affected the outcome of the verdict in the trial against Petitioner in
this matter[.]
(R., p. 36.)

Other than his verification of the petition, Wilson presented no

additional evidence supporting this allegation.
The state, however, presented evidence of proceedings in the criminal
case. Among that evidence was a stipulation entered into by the parties in the
criminal case to join the charges, filed on January 24, 2011. (R., p. 120.) The
parties put on the record the basis for the stipulation, and Wilson personally
agreed to the stipulation even after it was explained to him that evidence that
was inadmissible as to one charge would be admitted at a joint trial. (R., pp.
148-49 (1/24/11 Tr., p. 9, L. 4 – p. 16, L. 9).) One of the grounds specified by
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defense counsel for stipulating was to avoid exposure to the habitual offender
enhancement. (R., p. 148 (1/24/11 Tr., p. 10, L. 11 – p. 11, L. 251).)
The issue of consolidation was again addressed on February 28, 2011, at
a status hearing the day before the jury trial was to start. (Trial Tr., p. 25, L. 8 –
p. 28, L. 9.) Defense counsel represented that at the time of the initial stipulation
to consolidate he had believed Wilson was not eligible for the enhancement on
either case absent a conviction in one of them. (Trial Tr., p. 25, Ls. 14-18.)
Some time the prior week, however, the prosecution had done a background
check and discovered Wilson had “four prior felony convictions.” (Trial Tr., p. 25,
Ls. 19-25.) Defense counsel represented that “if we had known that, we may
have come up with a different position on whether or not to consolidate these
matters,” because the stipulation ultimately did not accomplish the goal of making
Wilson ineligible for the enhancement.

(Trial Tr., p. 26, Ls. 1-23.2) The parties

then put on the record that they had stipulated that “[i]f these cases are tried
together and go forward to trial tomorrow, [the state was] not moving to add the
habitual.” (Trial Tr., p. 26, L. 24 – p. 27, L. 15.)
In post-conviction the district court determined that the initial stipulation
“was a strategy based on ignorance, because in fact, Mr. Wilson already had
sufficient felonies that [the state] could have filed a persistent violator

Trial counsel recognized that the enhancement only mattered in the failure to
register case, because that crime, unlike lewd conduct, did not already carry a
sentence of up to life. (R., p. 148 (1/24/11 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 23-25).)
1

Counsel’s use of the word “we” is interesting here because it is highly
implausible that Wilson was ignorant of the fact he had been convicted of more
than one felony.
2
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enhancement.” (3/23/15 Tr., p. 10, L. 24 – p. 11, L. 7.) There was no ineffective
assistance of counsel, however, because the parties reached the same deal
once the accurate facts became known. (3/23/15 Tr., p. 11, Ls. 8-18.)
On appeal Wilson argues that the district court erred because “[b]y the
time defense counsel realized his mistake one week before trial, it was too late to
move to sever the two unrelated cases,” and claims trial counsel’s agreement to
keep the cases joined was based on “last minute attempts to rationalize the
decision.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 16.) Wilson’s claims of error fail, because they
are not based on the law or the facts.
B.

Standard Of Review
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file.” Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803
(2007).
C.

The Record And The Law Support The District Court’s Summary
Dismissal
To avoid summary dismissal, a post-conviction petitioner must present

admissible evidence making out a prima facie case as to each essential element
of the claims upon which the petitioner bears the burden of proof. Adams v.
State, 158 Idaho 530, 537, 348 P.3d 145, 152 (2015); DeRushé v. State, 146
Idaho 599, 603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009); Arellano v. State, 158 Idaho 708,
710, 351 P.3d 636, 638 (Ct. App. 2015); Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647,
6

873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct. App. 1994). “Allegations contained in the application are
insufficient for the granting of relief when (1) they are clearly disproved by the
record of the original proceedings, or (2) do not justify relief as a matter of law.”
Workman, 144 Idaho at 522, 164 P.3d at 802.
The elements of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim are deficient
performance and resulting prejudice. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
687 (1984). To establish deficient performance, the petitioner “must show that
counsel’s representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.” Id.
at 688. To establish prejudice, a defendant must show “a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would
have been different.” Id. at 694. With respect to the prejudice prong, the United
States Supreme Court has articulated the petitioner’s burden under Strickland as
follows:
With respect to prejudice, a challenger must demonstrate “a
reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors,
the result of the proceeding would have been different. A
reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine
confidence in the outcome. [Strickland, 466 U.S.] at 694, 104 S.Ct.
2052. It is not enough “to show that the errors had some
conceivable effect on the outcome of the proceeding.” Id., at 693,
104 S.Ct. 2052. Counsel’s errors must be “so serious as to deprive
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.” Id., at
687, 104 S.Ct. 2052.
Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104 (2011). “When evaluating an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim, this Court does not second-guess strategic and
tactical decisions, and such decisions cannot serve as a basis for post-conviction
relief unless the decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation,
ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review.”
7

State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008).
The record in this case shows that the defense twice stipulated to joinder
of the cases in exchange for the prosecution’s waiver of the right to file a
persistent violator enhancement on the failure to register case. The first time, the
record shows, the stipulation was based on a factually erroneous belief that
Wilson had been convicted of only one prior felony. The second, however, was
based on a proper understanding of the facts.

The district court properly

concluded, therefore, that there was no evidence that the strategic decision to
stipulate to joinder in exchange for the state not filing a persistent violator
enhancement was the result of deficient performance nor that there was any
prejudice from the initial factual misunderstanding.
Wilson makes the general claim that the district court erred. (Appellant’s
brief, pp. 15-20.) Specifically, he argues: “By the time defense counsel realized
his mistake one week before trial, it was too late to move to sever the two
unrelated cases.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 16.) He also states that joinder “would
only harm” him and that the second stipulation was the result of “last minute
attempts to rationalize the decision” to initially agree to joinder. (Id.) Because
Wilson cites neither the record nor any law for these assertions, he has failed to
show error. State v. Willoughby, 147 Idaho 482, 488, 211 P.3d 91, 97 (2009)
(“This Court will not presume error on appeal, and an appellant bears the burden
of demonstrating error through the record.”).
More than a complete lack of support, the record actually refutes Wilson’s
argument. At the time of the second stipulation to keep the cases joined and not
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add the persistent violator enhancement the prosecutor put on the record how
the state intended to proceed if there had been no stipulation to join: “If we took
that route [lack of a stipulation], what we would do would be to is [sic] dismiss
and refile to separate the cases and go forward that way. So it’s not an issue for
trial tomorrow.” (Trial Tr., p. 27, Ls. 12-15.) The trial court agreed that the state
would otherwise have “the option of dismissing these and refiling, but that isn’t
anything in terms of adding [the enhancement] in for tomorrow.” (Trial Tr., p. 27,
Ls. 22-25.) Wilson’s appellate claim that it was too late to sever is simply wrong.
Moreover, in relation to the first stipulation the district court engaged in a colloquy
with Wilson, during which the court made sure Wilson understood that evidence
irrelevant to one charge would come in to trial to support the other charge, and
that Wilson agreed with the tactical decision to join the cases.

(R., p. 149

(1/24/11 Tr., p. 14, L. 4 – p. 16, L. 9).) Wilson’s appellate claim that there was no
tactical advantage to be had by joinder and that counsel was merely rationalizing
a wrong decision previously made is a complete fabrication contrary to the
record.
Wilson alleged that his trial counsel stipulated to joinder of the cases over
his objection and for no reason. The record of the underlying criminal case
shows that counsel, with Wilson’s full endorsement, stipulated to joinder in
exchange for the state not adding a persistent violator sentencing enhancement.
That counsel initially understood that Wilson was not immediately eligible for the
enhancement (a fact he could not have gotten wrong absent Wilson misleading
him or withholding information) ultimately played no role in the stipulation finally
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entered.

Counsel secured for Wilson freedom from being charged as a

persistent violator in exchange for stipulating to joinder, a tactical decision Wilson
supported at the time.

The district court correctly concluded that Wilson’s

allegations did not establish a prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel after considering the underlying record.
II.
Wilson Has Failed To Show Error In The Summary Dismissal Of His Claims That
Trial Counsel’s Presentation Of Evidence Was Ineffective
A.

Introduction
Wilson made various claims that counsel failed to present favorable

evidence at trial.

Specifically, he claimed counsel should have presented

employment, medical and driving records to rebut the victim’s testimony that he
molested her when driving between Twin Falls and Emmett (R., pp. 6, 12-14) and
that he failed to call several of Wilson’s family members to testify about his
access to the victim (R., pp. 6, 15-18). In support of these allegations Wilson
presented the following evidence3: An affidavit from Jered L. Wilson (Wilson’s
father) that he would have rebutted testimony offered at the preliminary hearing
that Wilson sexually abused the victim “every time” he drove her between Twin
Falls and Emmett by testifying that he was in the car on at least one of those trips
and knew no abuse had taken place (R., pp. 55-57); an affidavit from Barbara
Wilson (Wilson’s mother) stating that the sexual abuse could not have happened
Much of the affidavits is based on hearsay and is thus not admissible evidence.
The state here addresses only the relevant, admissible evidence provided in the
affidavits. Wilson relies extensively on portions of the affidavits that are not
admissible evidence. Ultimately, admissibility of the evidence does not change
the outcome of the analysis.
3
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at a house Wilson was renting to his sister and she never witnessed any signs of
inappropriate behavior between Wilson and the victim (R., pp. 58-60); an affidavit
from Jesse Wilson stating he never witnessed any signs of inappropriate
behavior (R., pp. 61-62); letters notifying Wilson his driver’s license was
suspended for 180 days beginning on March 20, 2006, and his commercial
driving privileges were suspended until March 20, 2007, because of a DUI
conviction (R., pp. 65-68); and medical records showing he had gone to the
emergency room on April 16, 2006, and January 22, 2007, complaining of ankle
pain (R., pp. 69-71).
In requesting summary dismissal the state pointed out that trial counsel
had explored the issues of Wilson’s ankle injury, presence of others in the car,
and access to the victim through cross-examination of state’s witnesses; that the
evidence offered by Wilson in the post-conviction did little, if anything, to rebut
the state’s evidence; and ultimately the evidence did not show deficient
performance on the tactical decision of what evidence to present or prejudice.
(R., pp. 82-83.) The district court dismissed based on the reasons articulated in
the state’s motion. (3/23/15 Tr., p. 9, L. 22 – p. 10, L. 1; p. 11, L. 19 – p. 14, L.
21.)
On appeal Wilson argues the district court erred because he presented a
prima facie claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. (Appellant’s brief, pp. 2026.) Application of the correct legal standards shows this argument to be without
merit.
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B.

Standard Of Review
“On review of a dismissal of a post-conviction relief application without an

evidentiary hearing, this Court will determine whether a genuine issue of material
fact exists based on the pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any
affidavits on file.” Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 523, 164 P.3d 798, 803
(2007).
C.

The District Court Properly Dismissed The Claim That Counsel Was
Ineffective For Not Presenting Certain Evidence Because That Decision
Was Tactical And There Was No Evidence Of Prejudice
“A court considering a claim of ineffective assistance must apply a ‘strong

presumption’ that counsel’s representation was within the ‘wide range’ of
reasonable professional assistance.” Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 104
(2011) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 689 (1984)). It is also
well established that “‘decision to impeach a witness is a tactical decision” and
“the decision of what evidence should be introduced at trial is also tactical.”
State v. Yakovac, 145 Idaho 437, 447, 180 P.3d 476, 486 (2008) (citing Bagshaw
v. State, 142 Idaho 34, 38, 121 P.3d 965, 969 (Ct. App. 2005)).

“When

evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, this Court does not secondguess strategic and tactical decisions, and such decisions cannot serve as a
basis for post-conviction relief unless the decision is shown to have resulted from
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings
capable of objective review.” State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123,
136 (2008).

Wilson presented no evidence of any objective shortcoming by
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counsel and therefore did not in any way rebut the presumption of effective
assistance of counsel.
The district court dismissed the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
because the record showed that trial counsel had addressed the issues related to
whether Wilson drove the victim alone and whether he had access to the victim
through cross-examination and the evidence provided by Wilson was of marginal
value. (3/23/15 Tr., p. 9, L. 22 – p. 10, L. 1; p. 11, L. 19 – p. 14, L. 21; see also
R., pp. 82-83 (state’s argument adopted by district court).) Because the decision
of what evidence to present is tactical, the evidence was of marginal utility to the
defense, and there is no evidence that trial counsel’s decision to not present the
proffered evidence was the basis of some objective shortcoming, the district
court properly concluded that there was no prima facie showing of deficient
performance or prejudice.
On appeal Wilson argues the district court erred because “the affidavits
called into question the veracity of the testimony presented at trial.” (Appellant’s
brief, p. 23.) “The district court should have thus held an evidentiary hearing
where the potential defense witnesses’ had knowledge that undercut the State’s
witnesses’ testimony.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 24 (grammar original).) As to the
driving and medical records, Wilson argues he “did not have to establish that he
was physically unable to drive for the entire two-year time period, it would have
been sufficient for his counsel to impeach the witnesses using such information,
in order to place further [sic] doubt in the jurors’ minds.” (Appellant’s brief, p. 26.)
This argument misapprehends the applicable law, however. It is not enough to
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show that the evidence was relevant, or even that some other attorney would
have chosen to present it at trial. Rather, Wilson must show that the decision to
not present the evidence was based on an objective shortcoming. Having failed
to present any objective shortcoming, Wilson failed to rebut the presumption that
counsel’s choices were not in violation of his constitutional duty. Having failed to
present any evidence rebutting the presumption of effective assistance, there
was no material issue of fact to decide.
The district court summarily dismissed Wilson’s claim that his counsel was
ineffective for choosing not to present testimony and documents that indicated
Wilson did not always pick up the victim alone for part of the period where the
sexual abuse was occurring because the evidence in question was of marginal
significance and counsel’s decision was tactical. Wilson has failed to show error
because there is nothing to rebut the presumption that counsel’s tactical decision
was within the range of constitutionally effective assistance.
CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm the summary dismissal
of Wilson’s petition for post-conviction relief.
DATED this 21st day of June, 2016.

_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 21st day of June, 2016, served a true
and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT by emailing an
electronic copy to:
SALLY J. COOLEY
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
at the following email address: briefs@sapd.state.id.us.

KKJ/dd

_/s/ Kenneth K. Jorgensen_
KENNETH K. JORGENSEN
Deputy Attorney General
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